agencies make major mistakes, and
still preserve the opportunity to learn from the
mistakes and improve in the future?
The answer is yes. My
favorite example occurred soon after the Bay of Pigs
fiasco in April, 1961. It was, by some accounts, the
greatest foreign policy blunder of the post WWII era.
Hundreds of Cuban exiles who invaded Cuba with support
from the US were captured and imprisoned. Many were
executed. And the US suffered a humiliating defeat in
the eyes of the world.
How did President Kennedy
react? He held a news conference less than a week after
the invasion failed, and told the reporters,
“There’s an old saying that victory has a
hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan.”
What matters, he said, is only one thing:
“I am the responsible officer of the
government.”
Kennedy didn’t
publicly blame the head of the CIA or Joint Chiefs of
Staff, although he probably felt like it. Those
individuals had assured him that the invasion would be
a success. Nobody was fired on the spot (although
Kennedy did remove the CIA director the following
year). Kennedy took responsibility for the disaster.
And there was no public outcry for independent
commissions and endless investigations.
Kennedy made two other
decisions that were impressive examples of
accountability following the Bay of Pigs. On April 22,
1961, just a few days after the invasion’s end,
he appointed Gen. Maxwell Taylor to head up a
commission that was to study the Bay of Pigs and
determine what lessons could be learned from the
disaster. Kennedy also told Taylor that he wanted to
know what he, Kennedy, did that might have contributed
to the problems, and what he could do differently in
the future. We didn’t use the term
“learning organization” back then, but
that’s essentially what President Kennedy wanted
to create.
Finally, Kennedy did what
many leaders find it difficult to do. He studied the
report that Taylor later gave him, and took the
recommendations to heart. He learned, for instance,
that he had been too involved in certain policy level
meetings leading up to the Bay of Pigs; that his
involvement had reduced the amount of candor among his
top aides; and that he needed to have someone involved
in such policy meetings who was absolutely loyal to
him. Many of those who planned the Bay of